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In addition, studies on motor preparation have shown that the 
instruction to later execute a particular movement results in increased 
activation of brain areas such as dorsal pre-motor cortex (PMd) 
and primary motor cortex (M1) (Riehle and Requin, 1989; Toni 
et al., 1999; Crammond and Kalaska, 2000; Cisek et al., 2003; Zang 
et al., 2003; Churchland et al., 2006). Instruction-related changes 
in activation have also been found in the thalamus (Michelon et al., 
2006), the supplementary motor area (SMA), the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; Nagai et al., 2004), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Ikeda 
et al., 1996), and the putamen (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Jaeger 
et al., 1993). Interestingly, single-cell recordings showed that cortical 
activation precedes activation in the putamen, suggesting that the 
preparatory activity in the putamen might be caused by input from 
M1 and SMA (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Mink, 1996).
Here we present an functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) study in people were given cues that provided probabilis-
tic information about the direction of movement of an upcoming 
random dot display (i.e., 90%, 70%, or 50% valid). At a behavioral 
level, we anticipated that the effect of this manipulation would be 
to bias people’s decision criteria, a prediction that we veriﬁ  ed by 
ﬁ  tting a quantitative model to the behavioral data. At a neural level, 
we anticipated that the effect of the manipulation would be to acti-
vate subcortical, striatal areas involved in motor planning and action 
preparation (Mink, 1996; Draganski et al., 2008; Utter and Basso, 
2008). In addition, we anticipated that this striatal activation would 
be accompanied by activation in cortical control areas such as DLPFC 
(van Veen et al., 2008), ACC (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof 
et al., 2004; Behrens et al., 2007), or OFC (Frank and Claus, 2006).
INTRODUCTION
Even in the simplest perceptual tasks, decision making can be 
a complex affair. Consider, for instance, the “moving dots” task 
(Britten et al., 1992), popular in research on single-cell activity in 
monkeys. In this task, participants have to decide quickly – either 
by making a saccade or by pressing a response button – whether a 
display of dots appears to move to the left or to the right. Despite 
its superﬁ  cial simplicity, successful performance in this task requires 
the participant not only to process the currently available informa-
tion effectively (Kim and Shadlen, 1999; Schall, 2001; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008), but also to take into account 
information collected in the past.
This article addresses the question of how the brain incorporates 
prior knowledge in order to guide perceptual decision making (e.g., 
Bestmann et al., 2008; Summerﬁ  eld and Koechlin, 2008; Scheibe 
et al., 2009). In the moving dots task, prior information may be 
obtained either from previous experience (e.g., 90% of past stimuli 
required a “left” response) or from a cue that precedes the presenta-
tion of the target stimulus. The cue imparts information by suggest-
ing a particular response, hence reducing target uncertainty (e.g., 
a cue could signal that the upcoming stimulus is likely to require 
a “left” response). Single-cell recordings in monkeys have shown 
that a reduction in target uncertainty leads to increased activa-
tion in area LIP (Platt and Glimcher, 1999), increased activation 
of superior colliculus (SC) neurons (Basso and Wurtz, 1997, 1998; 
Dorris and Munoz, 1998), and increased activation in substantia 
nigra pars reticularis (SNr) neurons of the basal ganglia (Basso 
and Wurtz, 2002).
The neural substrate of prior information in perceptual 
decision making: a model-based analysis
Birte U. Forstmann1*, Scott Brown2, Gilles Dutilh3, Jane Neumann4 and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers3
1  Spinoza Center for Neuroimaging, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
2  School of Psychology, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia
3  Department of Psychological Methodology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
4  Department of Cognitive Neurology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
Prior information biases the decision process: actions consistent with prior information are 
executed swiftly, whereas actions inconsistent with prior information are executed slowly. How 
is this bias implemented in the brain? To address this question we conducted an experiment 
in which people had to decide quickly whether a cloud of dots moved coherently to the left or 
to the right. Cues provided probabilistic information about the upcoming stimulus. Behavioral 
data were analyzed with the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) model, conﬁ  rming that people 
used the cue to bias their decisions. The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data 
showed that presentation of the cue differentially activated orbitofrontal cortex, hippocampus, 
and the putamen. Directional cues selectively activated the contralateral putamen. The fMRI 
analysis yielded results only when the LBA bias parameter was included as a covariate, 
highlighting the practical beneﬁ  ts of formal modeling. Our results suggest that the human 
brain uses prior information by increasing cortico-striatal activation to selectively disinhibit 
preferred responses.
Keywords: response bias, model-based fMRI, response time modeling, cortico-striatal circuit, putamen, 
orbitofrontal cortex
Edited by:
Francisco Barceló, 
University of Illes Balears, Spain
Reviewed by:
Sven Bestmann, 
University College London, UK
Daphna Shohamy, 
Columbia University, USA
*Correspondence:
Birte U. Forstmann, 
Spinoza Center for Neuroimaging, 
University of Amsterdam, 
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB 
Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
e-mail: b.u.forstmann@uva.nlFrontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  2
Forstmann et al.  Prior information
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twenty healthy volunteers participated for a small monetary 
reward. In order to obtain sufﬁ  cient data for response time mod-
eling, each participant completed a behavioral session in addition 
to an fMRI scanning session. All participants signed a consent form 
prior to the scanning session, had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision, and none of them had a history of neurological, major 
medical, or psychiatric disorders. In the scanner, two participants 
produced excessive movement artifacts, and a third participant 
produced incorrect responses on more than 40% of the trials. The 
data from these participants were excluded from the analysis. The 
remaining 17 participants (9 women, M age = 25.2, SD age = 3.01) 
were all right-handed, as conﬁ  rmed by the Edinburgh Inventory 
(Oldﬁ  eld, 1971).
BEHAVIORAL TASK
We used the moving dots task (Britten et al., 1992; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007), which requires participants to decide whether a 
cloud of dots appears to move to the left or to the right (Figure 1). 
Out of 120 dots, 60 moved coherently and 60 moved randomly. 
From one 50-ms frame to the next, the “coherent set” of 60 dots 
were moved 1 pixel in the target direction, whereas the remaining 
“random set” of 60 dots were relocated randomly. On the subse-
quent frame, the coherent set and the random set switched roles, 
such that each dot was displaced coherently on one frame and 
displaced randomly on the next. This scheme ensures that the cloud 
remains centered, even though it gives the impression of moving 
systematically in one direction. Each dot consisted of three by three 
pixels, and the dots were uniformly distributed across a circle of 
diameter 250 pixels.
Participants indicated their response by pressing one of two 
spatially compatible buttons with their left or right index ﬁ  nger. 
A cue (i.e., “R9” and “R7” for 90% and 70% probability of right-
ward movement, “L9” and “L7” for 90% and 70% probability of 
leftward movement, “N5” for 50% probability) provided par-
ticipants with probabilistic information about the direction of 
movement of the upcoming stimulus. Reliable cues were valid on 
90% of the trials, moderate cues were valid on 70% of the trials, 
and neutral cues were valid on 50% of the trials (for a similar 
paradigm see, e.g., Basso and Wurtz, 1998, 2002). The cues were 
 pseudo-randomly  intermixed.
FIGURE 1 | Probabilistic cues in a moving dots paradigm. Moving dots 
paradigm with cues that provide participants with probabilistic information about 
the upcoming stimulus (i.e., “R9” and “L9” , reliable cues, indicating a 90% 
chance of rightward or leftward movement, respectively; “R7” and “L7” , 
moderate cues, indicating a 70% chance of rightward or leftward movement, 
respectively; “N5” , neutral cue, indicating that leftward and rightward movement 
are equally probable). The timing information refers exclusively to the 
fMRI session.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  3
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same basic assumptions about decision making with many leading 
models from the ﬁ  eld, most notably with those models that are vari-
ants of the “leaky competing accumulator” framework (Usher and 
McClelland, 2001). Here, we use the LBA model for two purposes: to 
check that our experimental manipulation had the intended effect 
on cognitive processes; and as a measurement model, to index the 
effect size induced by experimental manipulations for each subject. 
We could have used any other of the many decision models from 
mathematical psychology for these purposes, but chose the LBA 
because of its analytic simplicity – this model provides a complete 
description of benchmark decision phenomena, yet is sufﬁ  ciently 
simple to support easy computational application. We have some 
conﬁ  dence that the conclusions we would have drawn using another 
decision model than the LBA would not have been very different. 
For example, Donkin et al., submitted showed that the conclusions 
drawn from data using the LBA in experiments like ours are very 
similar from conclusions drawn using the most proliﬁ  c decision 
making theory, the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978).
The LBA model represents the decision process in our task – 
between two response options – as a race between two independent 
accumulators, illustrated in the top row of Figure 2. Recall that each 
time participants were presented with a random dot stimulus, one 
of the two response options was cued. In the model, on each trial the 
two accumulators begin with random activation values drawn from 
independent uniform distributions on [0, A]. After the stimulus is 
presented, activation increases in each accumulator at a rate that 
depends on the stimulus. For example, activation will generally 
increase quickly in the accumulator that corresponds to the correct 
response (left, in the example from the ﬁ  gure), but slowly in the 
accumulator that corresponds to the incorrect response (right). 
From one trial to the next, the rate with which activation increases 
is governed by a normal distribution. A response is triggered when-
ever the ﬁ  rst accumulator reaches the response threshold b. Thus, 
for any decision the observed response time is directly related to the 
time that the accumulators require to reach the threshold.
One way by which the LBA model can account for the biasing 
effect of prior information is by changing response thresholds, as 
shown in the bottom row of Figure 2. Suppose the cue indicates that 
the correct response is likely to be “right”, then the corresponding 
accumulator is biased by setting the response threshold (b) lower, 
and hence closer to the top of the start point distribution (A). In 
the example, the response threshold for the cued response (“right”) 
is set at bright, while that for the uncued response (“left”) is set at 
bleft. By choosing bright < bleft, the accumulator for the cued response 
“right” will, on average, begin closer to the response threshold than 
the accumulator for the uncued response “left”. This leads the model 
to predict that responses are faster, and more frequent, when they 
are cued than when they are not.
BAYESIAN INFORMATION CRITERION MODEL SELECTION FOR 
THE LBA MODEL
The LBA model has ﬁ  ve parameters that determine its predictions 
for a pair of correct and incorrect response time distributions. 
However, constraint can be gained by ﬁ  xing many of these param-
eters across different experimental conditions. For example, in the 
current experiment, one might hope that accumulation rate is unaf-
fected by cue manipulations, as these do not change the stimulus 
To keep participants motivated to respond quickly and accu-
rately, each trial was followed by a feedback message on response 
speed and response accuracy (i.e., “in time” and “too slow” for 
responses faster and slower than 750 ms, respectively; “correct” 
and “incorrect” for correct and error responses).
TIMING OF fMRI EXPERIMENT
The timing of the sequence of trials was triggered from the MRI 
control every 10 s. The trials started with a variable oversampling 
interval of 0, 500, 1000 or 1500 ms to obtain an interpolated tempo-
ral resolution of 500 ms. During the variable oversampling interval 
a ﬁ  xation cross was presented. Participants were asked to maintain 
ﬁ  xation. Then one of the ﬁ  ve cues was presented in the middle of 
the screen for 4800 ms (Figure 1). Cue presentation was followed 
by a jittered interval between 0 to 1500 ms in steps of 500 ms. The 
imperative stimulus (i.e., the moving dot pattern) was presented 
for 1500 ms and followed by 350 ms feedback.
The experiment consisted of 240 trials, plus 24 null events that 
were pseudo-randomly interspersed. These null events – during 
which only a ﬁ  xation cross was presented – were included to com-
pensate for the overlap of the blood-oxygenation level dependent 
(BOLD) response between adjacent trials. The cues “R9” and “L9” 
were valid (i.e., correctly indicated the direction of movement for 
the upcoming stimulus) in 36 out of 40 trials, and the cues “R7” 
and “L7” were valid in 28 out of 40 trials. The neutral cue “N5” 
was followed by a rightward moving stimulus in 40 out of 80 tri-
als. The experiment lasted about 40 min. For each participant, the 
experiment started out with two dummy trials (i.e., 10 scans) that 
were excluded from further analysis – this was done to prevent 
saturation effects.
BEHAVIORAL SESSION FOR THE ESTIMATION OF CUE-INDUCED BIAS
Two days prior to the scanning session, each participant performed 
the task outside the MRI scanner for about 40 min. This was done 
in order to acquire sufﬁ  cient data for the reliable estimation of 
cue-induced bias parameter using the Linear Ballistic Accumulator 
(LBA) model described below. The trial timing of the task for this 
behavioral session was modiﬁ  ed to maximize the number of obser-
vations, i.e., the cue-stimulus interval was set to 500 ms and there 
was no variable jitter at the beginning of the trial. Moreover, cue 
and stimulus were each presented for 1000 ms and no null events 
were interspersed. The behavioral session featured a total of 840 
trials; The cues “R9” and “L9” were valid (i.e., correctly indicated 
the direction of movement for the upcoming stimulus) in 126 out 
of 140 trials, and the cues “R7” and “L7” were valid in 98 out of 140 
trials. The neutral cue “N5” was followed by a rightward moving 
stimulus in 140 out of 280 trials.
LINEAR BALLISTIC ACCUMULATOR MODEL
We analyzed the behavioral data using a mathematical model for 
cognitive decision making, the Linear Ballistic Accumulator (LBA; 
Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Ho et al., 2009). The LBA model is 
conceptually similar to LATER (Linear Approach to Threshold with 
Ergodic Rate; Carpenter, 1981, 2004; Carpenter and Reddi, 2001; Ali 
et al., 2006; Nakahara et al., 2006), a model for saccadic latencies that 
has been successfully applied to the effects of urgency, probability, 
and stimulus difﬁ  culty in perceptual inference. The LBA shares the Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  4
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MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING SCANNING PROCEDURE
The experiment was carried out on a 3-T scanner (Medspec 
30/100, Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany). We acquired 26 axial slices 
(19.2 cm ﬁ  eld of view, 64 × 64 matrix, 4 mm thickness, 1 mm 
spacing) parallel to the AC-PC plane and covering the whole 
brain. Slice gaps were interpolated to generate output data with 
a spatial resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm. We used a single shot, 
gradient recalled echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repeti-
tion time 2000 ms, echo time 30 ms, 90° ﬂ  ip-angle). Prior to 
the functional runs, 20 anatomical MDEFT slices and 20 cor-
responding EPI-T1 slices were acquired. Stimuli were displayed 
using VisuaStim (Magnetic Resonance Technologies, Northridge, 
USA), consisting of two small TFT-monitors placed directly in 
front of the eyes, simulating a distance to a normal computer 
screen of about 100 cm with a resolution of 1024 × 768 and a 
refresh rate of 60 Hz.
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE ANALYSES
Analyses of fMRI data were performed using the in-house LIPSIA 
software (Lohmann et al., 2001). First, functional data were cor-
rected for movement artifacts. The temporal offset between the slices 
acquired in one scan was then corrected using a sinc interpolation 
algorithm. Data were spatially smoothed using a spatial Gaussian 
ﬁ  lter with sigma = 0.8 (this refers to a FWHM = 5.65 mm). A tem-
poral high-pass ﬁ  lter with a cutoff frequency of 1/160 Hz was used 
for baseline correction of the signal. All functional data sets were 
content. Similarly, one might suspect that the time taken for non-
decision processes will be smaller for cued responses than for uncued 
responses, due to effects such as motor preparation and perceptual 
priming. To test such assumptions more formally, we implemented 
192 different designs for constraining parameters across the two 
experimental manipulations of cue status and cue reliability. These 
192 designs consisted of factorial combinations of almost all param-
eter constraints. We tested designs where three of the parameters 
(b, A, and non-decision time t0) varied with either cue direction, or 
cue reliability, or both, or neither. This created 64 different designs 
for parameter constraints. For each of those designs, we tested three 
further versions: one version with the mean and variability of accu-
mulation rate (d and s) were held constant across all conditions; one 
version where they were allowed to vary with cue direction, and one 
where they were allowed to vary with cue reliability.
We estimated the individual LBA model parameters using the 
method of quantile maximum products (QMP, Heathcote and 
Brown, 2004). After obtaining parameter estimates, for each partici-
pant, Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values were calculated 
and summed (Schwarz, 1978). The summed BIC value allowed 
us to identify which set of parameter constraints provided the 
best description of the data (in total across subjects). This tests 
whether the experimental manipulation had the intended effect 
(i.e., to bias decisions) and also did not have other, unintended 
effects (e.g., inﬂ  uencing the rate at which information is extracted 
from the stimulus).
FIGURE 2 | The linear ballistic accumulator model and how it accounts for 
the effect of prior information. In the LBA model, the decision to respond either 
“left” or “right” is modeled as a race between two accumulators. For an unbiased 
decision (top row) activation in each accumulator begins at a random point 
between zero and A and increases at a rate that depends on the match between 
the stimulus and response. For every single decision the rate is ﬁ  xed (i.e., the 
accumulation process is deterministic), but from one decision to the next the rate 
ﬂ  uctuates according to a normal distribution. A response is given by whichever 
accumulator ﬁ  rst reaches the threshold b (i.e., the horizontal dotted line), and the 
predicted response time depends on the time taken to reach that threshold. For a 
biased decision (bottom row), the accumulator corresponding to the cued 
response uses a lower response threshold than the other accumulator (bright < bleft).Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  5
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term) was convolved with a Gaussian kernel with a dispersion of 
4s FWHM in order to account for the serial autocorrelation of the 
data and determine the degrees of freedom for the subsequent 
statistical analysis.
Contrast maps were generated for each participant after the 
individual data sets were all aligned to the same stereotactic refer-
ence space. Importantly, to the individual contrast maps we added a 
covariate, namely the LBA estimate for the individual difference in 
cue-induced response bias (see the section below on “LBA Model 
Fit to the Behavioral Data” for details). This covariate was entered 
at the second level of the random-effects model.
A one-sample t-test of contrast maps across participants 
(  random-effects model) was computed for statistical evaluation 
to ascertain whether observed differences between conditions were 
signiﬁ  cantly different from zero. Subsequently, t values were trans-
formed into z-scores. To correct for false-positive results, in a ﬁ  rst 
step, an initial voxelwise z-threshold was set to Z = 2.3 (p = 0.001, 
uncorrected) for the reliable vs. neutral, moderate vs. neutral and 
reliable vs. moderate covariance contrasts. In a second step, the 
results were corrected for multiple comparisons using cluster-size 
and cluster-value thresholds obtained by Monte-Carlo simulations 
using a signiﬁ  cance level of p = 0.05 (Table 1).
Finally, to investigate the neural substrates of setting cue-induced 
response bias common to both reliable vs. neutral and moderate vs. 
neutral, the corrected z-maps were included in a conjunction analysis, 
i.e., reliable vs. neutral and moderate vs. neutral (Nichols et al., 2005). 
individually registered into three-dimensional (3D) space using the 
participants’ individual high-resolution anatomical images. This 3D 
reference data set was acquired for each participant during a previ-
ous scanning session. The two-dimensional anatomical MDEFT 
slices, geometrically aligned with the functional slices, were used to 
compute a transformation matrix containing rotational and trans-
lational parameters that register the anatomical slices with the 3D 
reference T1 data set. These transformation matrices were normal-
ized to the standard Talairach brain size (Talairach and Tournoux, 
1988) by linear scaling and ﬁ  nally applied to the functional data.
Observational data were modeled using the general linear model 
for serially autocorrelated observations (Friston et al., 1995). In 
order to ensure that our activations are cue-induced, and not partly 
attributable to systematic differences in stimulus or response, we 
used the following set of regressors: cue reliability (reliable, moder-
ate, neutral), cue direction (left, right: only for reliable and moderate 
cues), null events, stimulus left and response left, stimulus right and 
response right. In addition, we included incorrect responses (i.e., 
stimulus left and response right and stimulus right and response 
left) as a single regressor – this was necessary because some partici-
pants had low error rates. The design matrix was generated using a 
synthetic hemodynamic response function comprised of a sum of 
Gamma functions (Friston et al., 1998; Glover, 1999) and its ﬁ  rst 
derivative. The onsets for the event-related analysis were set to the 
presentation of the cues at the beginning of each trial. The model 
equation (including observational data, design matrix, and error 
Table 1 | Anatomical location and Talairach coordinates with Z > 2.3 (p < 0.05, corrected) for the whole-brain covariance analyses for the contrasts 
reliable vs. neutral and moderate vs. neutral. Activations with a minimum volume size of 180 mm3 are shown. No signiﬁ  cant activations were found for the 
whole-brain contrast Reliable vs. Moderate or any of the reversed contrasts.
Anatomical area  Left hemisphere  Right hemisphere
 Talairach  coordinates  Zmax Talairach  coordinates  Zmax
RELIABLE VS. NEUTRAL
Thalamus  −7, −7, 3  3.9   
Frontopolar cortex  −39, 43, 0  3.9   
Pons  −12, −27, −31 3.7   
Middle frontal gyrus  −34, 27, 24  3.6   
Putamen     35,  −10, 0  3.5
Medial orbitofrontal cortex      7, 58, 8  3.4
Inferior temporal gyrus  −45, −46, −7 3.4   
Parahippocampal gyrus      18, −28, −8 3.3
Caudate  −11, 11, 11  3.2   
Parietal operculum  −54, −31, 20  3.1   
Postcentral gyrus      34, −34, 42  2.9
Cerebellum     21,  −40, −26 2.9
Inferior frontal gyrus  −51, 14, 14  2.8   
MODERATE VS. NEUTRAL
Middle temporal gyrus      50, −4, −14 4.2
Orbitofrontal cortex      18, 16, −11 4.0
Medial orbitofrontal cortex      7, 31, 0  3.7
Parahippocampal gyrus      30, −28, −4 3.5
Putamen     21,  −4, 2  3.4
Thalamus     1,  −7, −3 2.9
Putamen  −28, −14, 3  2.8   Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  6
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 accumulators, and for the three different levels of cue reliability. We 
tested 192 different ways of constraining these model parameters 
across conditions, estimating parameters separately for each con-
straint, and for each participant. From this, we chose the parameter 
constraints that provided the most suitable summary of the data, 
as judged by the summed BIC across participants (see Materials 
and Methods section for details). The best-BIC model was very 
simple – it was precisely the model illustrated in Figure 2. This 
model assumed a constant value for all parameters across all con-
ditions (for each participant), with just one exception: response 
bias was captured by allowing the response threshold to be lower 
in the cued than in the uncued direction. On average, the response 
threshold in the cued direction was bcued = 225 compared with 
buncued = 275 in the uncued direction (neutral trials had b = 256 
for both responses). The average of the other model parameters 
were t0 = 315 ms, A = 220, d = 0.863 and s = 0.332. Note that some 
of the 192 designs we tested allowed parameters to vary with cue 
reliability (moderate vs. reliable) as well as with cue direction, but 
their extra complexity was deemed unnecessary by the BIC analyses 
– supporting the above observation that “moderate” and “reliable” 
cues were treated equally by our subjects.
To re-assure ourselves that the model parameter constraints 
with the best-BIC did not depend unduly on small perturbations 
due to noise, we checked the next four best-BIC designs as well. 
These next four models all differed from this best design in only 
minor ways (such as allowing cue effects on non-decision time), 
and also had BIC values similar to the best model but substantially 
better than the poorer models (from sixth best onwards). The ways 
in which the top four models differed from the best-BIC model 
included small effects of cue direction on the motor response time 
This procedure allows us to conclude that the reported activations are 
signiﬁ  cantly different at p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons 
at the cluster level. To test for lateralization effects in the right and 
left putamen, beta values were extracted from a sphere with a 3 mm 
radius. The spheres were centered on the peak coordinate of the 
whole-brain conjunction analysis, i.e., reliable vs. neutral and moder-
ate vs. neutral. Finally, the effect of lateralization was quantiﬁ  ed by a 
two-way interaction between cue (i.e., rightward and leftward) and 
region (right hemisphere and left hemisphere) in a repeated measures 
ANOVAs conducted on individual beta values weighted by the LBA 
estimates for cue-induced response bias parameters.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Figure 3 summarizes the behavioral data. We obtained the expected 
bias pattern of results (Edwards, 1965; Carpenter and Williams, 
1995; Bogacz et al., 2006; Nakahara et al., 2006; Wagenmakers et al., 
2008): compared to a neutral cue, reliable and moderate cues help 
performance (i.e., decrease mean response time – RT – and error 
rate) when they are valid (i.e., when they correctly predict the direc-
tion of movement), and hurt performance when they are invalid. 
Note that the biasing effect is about equally large for reliable cues 
and moderate cues. This is conﬁ  rmed by the formal model analyses, 
and motivates the fMRI conjunction analysis presented later, as in 
Forstmann et al. (2008).
LBA MODEL FIT TO THE BEHAVIORAL DATA
In its most ﬂ  exible form, the LBA model would have ﬁ  ve param-
eters for each experiment condition; each of these parameters 
could plausibly be different between cued and uncued response 
FIGURE 3 | Probabilistic cues affect mean response time and accuracy. 
Compared to a neutral cue, reliable and moderate cues help performance (i.e., 
decrease mean RT and error rate) when they are valid (i.e., when they correctly 
predict the direction of movement), and hurt performance when they are invalid. 
Error bars denote 95% conﬁ  dence intervals on the mean values, obtained by 
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FIGURE 4 | The LBA model provides a good ﬁ  t to distributions of response 
times for correct and incorrect responses. Response time quantiles estimated 
from data (circles) and ﬁ  t by the LBA model (crosses with lines). The ﬁ  ve panels 
show data from different cue-target conditions. Labels Reliable, Moderate, and 
Neutral indicate the strength of the probabilistic prior information (i.e., 90% for 
“R9” and “L9” , 70% for “R7” and “L7” , and 50% for “N5”). Valid cues predicted the 
direction of movement correctly and invalid cues did not. Within each panel, the 
upper set of lines and symbols show quantiles for correct responses, and the lower 
set shows quantiles for incorrect responses. The data and model predictions were 
averaged across participants and across leftward and rightward stimulus directions.
(t0), or by holding b constant and instead explaining response bias 
by changes in start point distribution A. The best-BIC model in 
the sum across participants was also the best-BIC model at an 
individual participant level for 11 of the 17 participants. For the 
other six participants, two had a null-effect best-BIC model (i.e., 
no effect of the cue), two had the second-best-BIC model from the 
average analyses, and the remaining two showed additional effects 
of the cue on non-decision time.
The best-BIC model identiﬁ  ed above is very simple – just one 
parameter is changed to accommodate the experimental manipula-
tion. To conﬁ  rm that this restricted model still provided an adequate 
account of the data, Figure 4 plots the data (circles) against the pre-
dictions from this model (lines and crosses). In the ﬁ  gure, each distri-
bution is summarized using ﬁ  ve quantile estimates (the open circles) 
which estimate the associated cumulative distribution functions. For 
each distribution, the slowest (rightmost) symbol represents the 90% 
quantile – the response time below which 90% of the data fall. The 
next rightmost symbol represents the 70% quantile, the middle sym-
bol represents the 50% quantile, which is just the median, and the 
leftmost symbols represent the 30% and 10% quantiles. Using these 
quantiles, and combining them with response accuracy information, 
creates “defective cumulative distribution” functions – just like a usual 
CDF, but one that rises not to an upper value of 1 but instead to 
the probability associated with that response in question. Defective 
cumulative distribution functions are commonly used in response 
time analysis (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). A didactic example can 
help to illustrate the plot, and its meaning.
Within each panel, the x-axis shows the response time for the 
quantile estimates, and the y-axis shows the associated proportion 
of data. For example, in the left panel (for data from trials with relia-
ble and valid cues) the 50% quantile (median) for correct responses 
was 435 ms. Overall accuracy in that condition was 93.3%. Half of 
the correct response times fall below the 50% quantile, therefore 
46.7% of all response times fall below this value, so the data point 
is plotted at (x = 435, y = 0.467).
Figure 4 provides much more detail about the behavioral data 
than other methods of graphing the data, such as using mean RT or 
even showing independent distributions for correct and incorrect 
responses. For example, the RT distributions for incorrect responses 
in the valid cue conditions are slower than their associated correct 
RT distributions, but this is reversed in the invalid cue conditions, 
where incorrect responses are faster than correct responses. The 
LBA model provides a good ﬁ  t to all of these patterns, as well as 
capturing error rates, mean RT, and the distribution shapes in all 
cueing conditions. The predicted response probabilities are within 
2.7% of the observed values for all conditions, and the predicted 
response quantiles for correct responses are always within 29 ms 
of the observed quantiles. The model performs especially well for 
conditions that contain many observations. For conditions with 
fewer observations the model ﬁ  t decreases – the two leftmost panels 
show that the model overestimates the 0.9 quantile of the error 
distribution.
In sum, application of the LBA model conﬁ  rmed that the behav-
ioral effects of the probabilistic cues can be captured exclusively by 
selective changes or bias in the response threshold, as is visualized 
in Figure 2. This is important, because, in the analysis of the fMRI 
data (presented next) we used the LBA as a measurement tool, to 
quantify the size of the biasing effect induced by the experimental 
manipulation for each individual subject; this measurement relied 
on individual estimates for the response threshold parameter.
fMRI DATA: THE EFFECT OF CUE RELIABILITY
In the analysis of the fMRI data, we ﬁ  rst quantiﬁ  ed the effect of 
cue reliability by computing two contrasts: reliable cues vs. neutral 
cues and moderate cues vs. neutral cues. Details of the two contrasts 
are provided in Table 1. Importantly, each of these two contrasts 
was computed in the presence of a covariate, i.e., the difference in 
individual LBA estimates of response bias (e.g., [bi,uncued − bi,cued], 
where i indexes participants). The model parameters were esti-
mated using data collected in the behavioral sessions, but fMRI data Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  | Article 40  |  8
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that these fMRI contrasts are based on the activation elicited by 
the cue, which means that the focus is entirely on preparatory 
processes initiated by the presentation of the probabilistic cue. 
The later processes initiated by the presentation of the stimulus 
are not of interest here.
The most parsimonious explanation of the conjunction analy-
sis is that abstract information from the cue is first analyzed and 
interpreted (e.g., in terms of past and future consequences, and 
affective value) by the hippocampus-OFC system, a system that 
subsequently biases the putamen in order to facilitate the execution 
of the more probable response. We elaborate on this explanation 
in the section “Discussion”.
We should stress that the areas shown in Figure 5 can be iden-
tified only after adding the individual LBA estimates of bias as a 
covariate. Without the LBA bias estimate as a covariate, there is 
no cue-induced BOLD activation that survives statistical scrutiny, 
despite profound cue-induced differences in observed behavior. 
The covariate is helpful because it takes into account individual 
differences in the latent processes of interest. That is, some par-
ticipants reacted much more effectively to the cue manipulation 
than others, but these differences would ordinarily be invisible 
to the fMRI analyses; instead this variability would be included 
in analysis’ error variance terms. Using the LBA parameters as 
covariates allows this variance to be partitioned out, providing 
a better estimate of the effects of the experimental manipulation 
on the fMRI data.
In sum, our results show that prior information about the direc-
tion of the upcoming stimulus leads to activation the OFC, the 
hippocampus, and the bilateral putamen. The latter effect is further 
analyzed in the next section.
fMRI data: the effect of cue dIRectIon
The bilateral pattern of activation in the putamen suggests the 
possibility  that  the  activation  in  this  structure  is  sensitive  to 
the direction suggested by the cue. We again carried out a con-
junction analysis (reliable vs. neutral and moderate vs. neutral) 
and  separately  assessed  activation  elicited  from  leftward  and 
rightward cues.
The outcome of this analysis is presented in Figure 6, which 
shows  contralateral  activation:  presentation  of  a  leftward  cue 
induces activation preferentially in the right putamen, and pres-
entation of a rightward cue induces activation preferentially in the 
left putamen, F(1,16) = 5.35, p = 0.03.
As in the other fMRI analyses, the contralateral pattern of acti-
vation is only statistically reliable when the LBA bias parameter is 
included as a covariate.
dIscussIon
Our findings suggest that the impact of prior information on per-
ceptual decision making is mediated by both cortical and striatal 
structures. This result is generally consistent with the idea that 
that the information from the cue is first processed by cortical 
areas (e.g., OFC, as in Ikeda et al., 1996); once these areas begin 
to favor a particular course of action, they send excitatory input 
to the striatum (e.g., putamen) which in turn suppresses the out-
put nuclei of the basal ganglia, thereby releasing from inhibition 
several brain structures such as the thalamus and (pre)motor areas 
were collected in a different session. To re-assure ourselves that the 
participants did not react radically differently to the experimental 
manipulation during these two parts of the experiment, we com-
pared parameter estimates from the behavioral session (described 
above) with parameters estimated using only those behavioral data 
collected during the fMRI scanning sessions. These fMRI parameter 
estimates were much more variable than those estimated from the 
behavioral sessions, because they were based on only one-quarter as 
many observations. Nevertheless, when we calculated the final index 
of experimental effect size ([bi,uncued − bi,cued]) separately for each 
subject using either behavioral-session data, or scanning-session 
data, these estimates correlated quite well (r = 0.58).
Figure 5 shows the conjunction of the two fMRI contrasts. 
Whereas in logic a conjunction is defined as an AND between 
truth statements, in neuroimaging a conjunction refers to acti-
vation caused by task X AND by task Y (Nichols et al., 2005; 
for a similar analysis see Forstmann et al., 2008). Thus, our 
conjunction analysis identifies those brain areas that are dif-
ferentially active both in the reliable vs. neutral contrast and in 
the moderate vs. neutral contrast, with LBA bias incorporated 
as a covariate.
The conjunction analysis reveals focused activation in both 
cortical and subcortical areas (p < 0.05 for both individual con-
trasts, corrected for multiple comparisons at the cluster level). 
Specifically, Figure 5 shows that compared to a neutral cue, the 
presentation of moderate and reliable cues was accompanied by 
activation in OFC, hippocampus, and bilateral putamen. Note 
Figure 5 | Cortico-subcortical circuit involved in the processing of prior 
information. Whole-brain activation map averaged over 17 participants and 
rendered onto an individual brain, using the change in LBA bias as a 
covariate. Red labels indicate positive Z values. The activations are calculated 
from a conjunction analysis, that is, they reflect the areas that are 
differentially active both in the contrast for reliable vs. neutral cues and in the 
contrast for moderate vs. neutral cues. Coordinates are given in Talairach 
space.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  9
Forstmann et al.  Prior information
Furthermore, Karnath et al. (2002) found that left hemispheric 
neglect is associated with lesions in the right putamen, and 
Delmaire et al. (2005) found that dystonic subjects had altered 
somatotopic organization in the left putamen, contralateral to 
their affected hand. Finally, Gerardin et al. (2003) showed that 
hand movements activated the contralateral putamen more than 
the ipsilateral putamen.
The cue-induced contralateral activation of the putamen sug-
gests that a probabilistic cue initiates the partial preparation of 
the most likely motor response. This is of theoretical interest 
because almost all formal models of speeded decision making 
assume that the role of prior information is to bias the starting 
value of a purely cognitive response selection process (Ratcliff and 
McKoon, 2008; Wagenmakers et al., 2008); the motor execution 
process is assumed to follow the cognitive process only after a 
complete decision has been reached. Our results suggest that this 
serial-stage perspective is unlikely to be correct, and that response 
selection and motor preparation may proceed in a more cascaded 
fashion instead.
HIPPOCAMPUS AND OFC
In our study, the primary cortical control structures we identiﬁ  ed 
are the hippocampus and the OFC. The hippocampus has strong 
reciprocal connections to the OFC (Ramus et al., 2007); in epileptic 
patients undergoing an intra-cranial EEG, for instance, electrical 
stimulations of the hippocampus evokes activation in the OFC 
(Catenoixa et al., 2005). The activation of hippocampus and OFC 
may therefore reﬂ  ect the activation of a single system for anticipa-
tion, evaluation, and learning.
Specifically, Johnson et al. (2007) review the literature on 
rodent reinforcement learning and navigation and conclude 
that decision making involves a network of brain areas includ-
ing hippocampus, OFC, and striatum. Johnson et al. (2007) 
further argue that the hippocampus is involved in prospection 
and projection, whereas the evaluation of this retrieved informa-
tion occurs in OFC, and action selection occurs in ventral and 
dorsomedial striatum. This line of theorization is consistent 
with our account. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the 
OFC has no direct anatomical connections to the dorsolateral 
putamen, the part of the putamen that is known to be involved 
in preparatory motor activation; the OFC does have direct con-
nections to the ventral part of the   putamen (Draganski et al., 
2008, Figure 3), but this ventral part did not show differential 
activation in our study. One possibility is that the evaluative 
information encoded in OFC is relayed to the dorsolateral puta-
men in a sub-threshold fashion via other brain structures such 
as DLPFC, ACC, and pre-motor and motor areas. Another pos-
sibility is that the OFC activates the ventral putamen in a sub-
threshold fashion, and the ventral putamen then activates the 
dorsolateral putamen.
The role of the hippocampus in learning and the development 
and adjustment of conceptual knowledge is well-known (Adcock 
et al., 2006; Shohamy et al., 2008; Kumaran et al., 2009); in our 
particular paradigm, however, there appears to be no immediate 
need for learning – the cue signals the probability of the upcoming 
event, and earlier associations between cues and events are irrel-
evant once the cue information is deemed veridical. Nevertheless, 
FIGURE 6 | Contralateral activation of the putamen due to presentation 
of a probabilistic cue for rightward and leftward movement of an 
upcoming stimulus. Weighted beta values are based on the conjunction of 
areas active both in the contrast for reliable vs. neutral cues and in the contrast 
for moderate vs. neutral cues, separately for leftward cues and rightward 
cues. The beta values are weighted by the change in cue-induced individual 
bias parameters estimated from the LBA model.
(Mink, 1996; Leh et al., 2007). Thus, the hippocampus, OFC, and 
putamen – activated here upon presentation of the probabilistic 
cue – can be seen as part of an action-selection circuit involved 
in motor preparation and cognitive control. We now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of the individual areas identiﬁ  ed in the 
present work.
PUTAMEN
Our results show that the prior presentation of probabilistic 
information leads to the contralateral activation of the dor-
solateral putamen, a brain structure involved in motor plan-
ning (e.g., Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Jaeger et al., 1993). 
Contralateral activation of the putamen has also been reported 
in other work. For instance, Ouchi et al. (2002) conducted a PET 
study and found that, in contrast to patients with Parkinson 
disease (PD), healthy participants showed substantial dopamine 
release in the dorsal striatum contralateral to the execution of 
movement. Also, Kaasinen et al. (2000) reported that early 
PD patients showed an increase in dopamine D2 receptors 
for the putamen contralateral to the predominant symptoms. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  May 2010  | Volume 4  |  Article 40  |  10
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encode prior information, but here we have shown that  subcortical 
and higher-level cortical brain areas may be involved as well. The 
fMRI technology we used is ideally suited to identify a widely 
distributed network of brain areas, and this is what allowed us 
to discover cue-induced activation in OFC and hippocampus. 
However, the limited temporal resolution of fMRI makes it dif-
ﬁ  cult to study the dynamics of the network and the ﬂ  ow of infor-
mation; for this, other methods such as single-cell recordings are 
more appropriate.
We believe our result may generalize to decision making in 
other contexts. In particular, we expect the same mechanisms to 
be active whether the cue is explicit (e.g., “L9”) or learned via expe-
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90% of the cases). In fact, the need for experience-based learning 
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active in higher-level, non-perceptual decision making situations. 
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It is important to note that our results have been obtained with 
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to capture the processes that are involved in making decisions 
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participants were scanned). Only when the relevant LBA parameter 
was added as a covariate to the regression equation did the error 
variance decrease sufﬁ  ciently for the interpretable pattern of acti-
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the presentation of the cue is likely to automatically activate the 
associations with earlier events to link the visual information pro-
vided by the cue (i.e., “L9”) to the consequences experienced in the 
past. It is also possible that the hippocampus is directly involved 
in encoding information about conditional uncertainty and the 
probabilistic consequences of encountered events (Strange et al., 
2005; Harrison et al., 2006). In this view, the hippocampus may 
mediate expectations in a probabilistic environment.
The OFC is a structure involved in reinforcement learning and 
the representation of value and reward (Schultz, 2004; Frank and 
Claus, 2006; Wallis, 2007). The OFC signals the “desirability of 
expected outcomes” (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005) and has also 
been found to reﬂ  ect changes in reward contingencies (O’Doherty 
et al., 2003b). In our experiment, the information from the cue 
does not signal reward directly; nevertheless, prior information 
about the upcoming stimulus decreases uncertainty and increases 
the probability of giving a correct answer, and this may constitute a 
more abstract form of reward, at least for humans. In other words, 
an informative cue such as “L9” (i.e., there is a 90% chance that 
the upcoming stimulus requires the “left” response) signals that 
the upcoming trial going to be easier than expected, informa-
tion thought to be encoded by the OFC (e.g., Summerﬁ  eld and 
Koechlin, 2008). Moreover, O’Doherty (2007) argues that the OFC 
is involved in adaptive decision making and the ﬂ  exible control 
of behavior and that it encodes “signals that inform an individual 
about what action to take next” (O’Doherty, 2007, p. 254). Finally, 
Ikeda et al. (1996) report that OFC activity in the period of uncer-
tainty and anticipation that precedes the imperative stimulus.
The current discussion highlights that the precise role of the 
OFC-hippocampal system in the processing of prior knowledge is 
not yet fully understood; the present work does suggest that this sys-
tem may encodes the consequences and affective value of the prior 
information. This knowledge can then be used to bias the putamen 
in order to facilitate the execution of the more probable response. 
We acknowledge that the OFC is only one of several cortical control 
structures that may respond to advance   probabilistic information 
about the upcoming target; these other – more  prominent – control 
structures include the pre-SMA (Mars et al., 2009), DLPFC (van Veen 
et al., 2008), and ACC (Botvinick et al., 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004; Behrens et al., 2007). In the present experiment the activation 
of these structures did not exceed the threshold for reporting.
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